Entries for category:   Non Profit Governance

Oct 29, 2009

What Happens When Your Organization is "In the Zone?"
 

In a troubled economy where businesses are struggling to survive, it is no surprise that many organizations find themselves insolvent or nearly insolvent. Directors of insolvent or nearly insolvent organizations are facing the question of to whom they owe their duty of loyalty, and whose best interest must they consider when making decisions. When in the zone of insolvency, directors still owe a duty to stakeholders to act in their best interests. Judicial decisions in some jurisdictions, however, have suggested that when an organization is insolvent or in the “zone of insolvency,” the directors’ fiduciary duties extend to the organization’s creditors as well.

Ohio courts have not decided whether directors of an insolvent or nearly insolvent corporation owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation’s creditors. Federal courts applying Ohio law, however, have held that directors owe no such duty to creditors. The cases, discussed below, rely on Ohio Rev. Code § 1701.59 to reach their conclusions. Rev. Code § 1701.59(B) imposes a duty on a director to act in good faith and in a manner that he believes is in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation. Section 1701.59(E) explains the factors a director may take into consideration when performing his duty:

(E) For purposes of this section, a director, in determining what the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, shall consider the interests of the corporation’s shareholders and, in the director’s discretion, may consider any of the following:

(1) The interests of the corporation’s employees, suppliers, creditors, and customers . . . .

Ohio Rev. Code § 1701.59(E) (emphasis added). The most significant language is the distinction between the mandatory consideration (the interests of the shareholders) and the permissive considerations (which include the interests of the corporation’s creditors). 

In Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of PHD, Inc. v. Bank One, the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio granted a director’s motion to dismiss and found that the director of an insolvent corporation owed no fiduciary duty to the corporation’s creditors. The Committee argued that upon PHD’s insolvency, the director owed a duty of care to PHD’s unsecured creditors. The Committee further argued that he breached this duty by failing to fulfill his responsibilities as a director, failing to prevent others from making misrepresentations to PHD’s creditors, and failing to mitigate the effect of others’ misrepresentations to the creditors. 

The court disagreed. It focused on the word “may” § 1701.59(E) and determined that there was no indication that the legislature intended that consideration of creditors’ interests was anything other than permissive. The court denied the motion for reconsideration as to the dismissal of the Committee’s claims for breach of fiduciary duty owed to the creditors. The court explained, “because Ohio statutory law explicitly defines the duties of directors of a corporation, and because that explicit definition does not require directors to consider the interests of creditors, there is no fiduciary duty owed by directors to creditors, regardless of the financial state of the corporation.” 

The court granted the motion for reconsideration as to dismissal of the Committee’s claims that the directors breached their fiduciary duties to the corporation because none of the parties had moved to dismiss those claims, so the court’s dismissal of those claims was clear error. This distinction clarifies the court’s belief that under Ohio law, even during insolvency, directors do not owe fiduciary duties to a corporation’s creditors. However, the creditors of an insolvent corporation may bring a claim for breach of fiduciary duty to the corporation itself.

In In re Amcast Industrial Corp., the bankruptcy court took a similar approach and reached the same conclusion, that officers and directors do not owe a fiduciary duty to a corporation’s creditors even if the corporation is insolvent or in the zone of insolvency. There, the court concluded:

The plain language of Ohio Rev. Code § 1701.59(E) clarifies that a director has discretion to consider many constituencies of the corporate enterprise, including creditors, when making corporate decisions. However, a director has no distinct legal obligation directly to creditors, separate from the corporate entity as a whole, even when a corporation has reached the point of insolvency. 

Thus, the court found that Ohio law does not impose a fiduciary duty on directors to a corporation’s creditors when the corporation is insolvent or nearly insolvent.

While not controlling on Ohio courts, Bank One and Amcast may be influential on the issue because they reflect reasonable applications of Rev. Code § 1701.59(E).

Ohio state courts have not determined the issue, but the Supreme Court of Delaware recently analyzed it in detail in National American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla. Because Ohio case law is silent on the subject, an Ohio court might consider a Delaware business law case as persuasive authority. In Gheewalla, the plaintiff was a creditor of Clearwire Holdings, Inc. The defendants were directors of Clearwire while it was either insolvent or in the zone of insolvency. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants breached the fiduciary duties they owed to the plaintiff as a creditor. 

The Supreme Court affirmed the Chancery Court’s decision to dismiss the complaint. It first held, “no direct claim for breach of fiduciary duties may be asserted by the creditors of a solvent corporation that is operating in the zone of insolvency.” The court reasoned that creditors, unlike shareholders, have contractual agreements, fraud and fraudulent conveyance law, implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing, bankruptcy law, commercial law, and other sources of creditor rights to protect them. It concluded that a corporation in the zone of insolvency is most in need of effective and proactive leadership and the ability to negotiate with creditors; a direct fiduciary duty cause of action for creditors likely would undermine these goals. Finally, when in the zone of insolvency, the court stated that the focus for directors does not change; they must continue to exercise their business judgment in the best interests of the corporation for the benefit of the shareholders. For all of these reasons, the court refused to allow creditors to bring direct claims for breach of fiduciary duty.

Second, the Supreme Court held, “individual creditors of an insolvent corporation have no right to assert direct claims for breach of fiduciary duty against corporate directors.” (emphasis by court). The court noted that when a corporation is insolvent, creditors take the place of shareholders as beneficiaries of an increase in value, so creditors of an insolvent corporation have standing to maintain derivative claims on behalf of the corporation for breaches of fiduciary duties. However, to find that directors owe fiduciary duties directly to creditors “would create uncertainty for directors who have a fiduciary duty to exercise their business judgment in the best interest of the insolvent corporation.” It also would conflict with the directors’ duty to maximize the value of the insolvent corporation for the benefit of all those with an interest in it. Therefore, while creditors of an insolvent corporation may bring a derivative action against the directors for breach of fiduciary duty, they cannot bring a direct action because the directors owe no fiduciary duty to the creditors.

Given the vast experience of Delaware courts with business and corporate law matters, Ohio state courts may well see Gheewalla as persuasive on the issue. Furthermore, as the federal courts explained in Amcast and Bank One, the plain language of Rev. Code § 1701.59(E) supports a finding that directors do not owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation’s creditors regardless of the corporation’s financial state. This is especially true given that the statute expressly makes the consideration of shareholders’ interests mandatory but makes consideration of creditors’ interests permissive. Thus, we can say that Ohio law probably does not impose on corporate directors a fiduciary duty to the corporation’s creditors when the corporation is insolvent or nearly insolvent. Still, with no Ohio case on point, it is impossible to conclude with certainty.


 
Posted by K. Kinross in  Director & Officer Insurance, Indeminification, and Other Protections  Fiduciary Duties  Non Profit Governance   |   Permalink

 

Jan 30, 2009

Providing Direction and Oversight in 2009: Nonprofit governance in wake of the economic crisis
 

Today, nonprofit corporations are saddled with a changing governance environment that brings with it a need to examine current board practices and consider new ones. These changes in expectations for nonprofit boards have been prompted, in part, by the new Form 990 but also by the economic crisis fueled by the host of for-profit meltdowns of AIG, Lehman Brothers, Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae and others this past year. 

While the economic crisis was not driven by nonprofit companies, it will impact corporate governance of all organizations. This crisis has generated discussion and rumored regulation, and it requires nonprofit boards to adopt new practices. The evolving changes in today's governance best practices - and the way nonprofits should respond - are critical to the health and sustainability of the organization. 

Wall Street has shattered the public trust and confidence in the for-profit world, and retaining the public trust and confidence in charitable organizations and nonprofits is critical to accomplishing their missions. However, without shareholders, nonprofits are missing the built-in accountability of the for-profit world, which means that the boards and executive directors of nonprofits must play the role of watchdog to ensure that the public trust and confidence is maintained and to do their part to resurrect corporate America without increased regulation. 

To do so, it is incumbent on all boards to take a step back, take a critical look and assess their structure, composition, committee charters and past performance and determine whether they are prepared for the current challenges and risks to the organizations. 

As we embark on what will certainly be an uncertain year, nonprofit boards should consider taking the following steps to maintain the public's trust and confidence in their organizations and to act before the government can react: 

  • Board Education. Boards should begin with educating their members to be better directors, to become more familiar with the risks to their organizations, to be more aware of the strengths and weaknesses of the members of management and to learn how to hold management accountable for information being provided.

  • Assess Current Board Experience and Add Directors with Needed Experience, Skills and Expertise. Boards should assess and create a database inventorying the experience, skills and expertise of their current members. That database expertise should be reviewed periodically to evaluate whether the correct mix is represented by the current members of the board. The goal of the organization should be to create an "expertised board" composed of persons each having particular experience, skills or expertise needed for the board to have as a whole.

  • Access to Independent Advisors Who Can Provide Necessary Counsel. Because it takes time to constitute a board composed of the appropriate mix of experience, skills and expertise, a board should require that it be given access to independent advisors having the experience, skills and expertise to counsel the board. This requires a board to first have access to a database of such advisors and then to have the resources to retain those advisors to counsel the board. This is important because it is likely that boards will be judged by state attorney generals, regulators, donors and eventually courts by the least experienced, least skilled or least knowledgeable of its members unless such members have access to such counsel. 

  • Coaching on Asking Questions. Boards should periodically receive coaching or training on how to ask questions, including: the purposes for which they should be asking questions; the extent to which they should ask questions; when they should accept answers and stop asking questions; and when they need to explore more deeply. This should be considered on a matter-by-matter basis for issues a director identifies that may need the help of an independent advisor. It also should be considered periodically as part of the board's continuing education process. 

  • Authorize a Standing Committee to Oversee Enterprise Risks. Boards should delegate to a standing committee, or constitute a new standing committee with authority on behalf of the board to investigate, assess and take appropriate action with respect to risks of the organization's enterprise. To facilitate the exercise of this authority, a board should require the organization's management, including each of its executive officers, to report such risks to this oversight committee and to meet at least annually with the committee in executive session.

  • Annual Review of the Roles and Responsibilities of Board Committees and Committee Charters. All organizations need to review their committee charters to ensure that such committees have the requisite authority necessary to complete its delegated tasks and additionally to ensure that such committees do not have authority greater than what the full board desires to grant Committee charters are often the most ignored governing document for any organization. The charter of any committee should be discussed, if not negotiated, between the directors who are on the committee and the remaining directors who will rely on the committee on an annual basis. A charter not only protects non-committee members from liability, but also imposes that liability on the committee members. For directors, state law allows them to rely upon a committee of directors of which they are not members. However, a director may rely upon a committee only for matters within the committee's designated authority and the committee has a legal duty of care to carry out that authority as an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would do under similar circumstances and a legal duty of loyalty to do so only in, or not opposed to, the best interest of the organization. Thus, it is imperative that the authority of a specific committee is properly and clearly designated in its charter. 

  • Best Practices Audit. Most organizations have their financial statements audited on a yearly basis. However, very few conduct an audit, either formal or informal, of its corporate governance practices. A yearly audit of governance practices goes a long way in creating a productive board and ensuring your board is operating effectively. 

  • Board Evaluations/Individual Director Evaluations. Boards must strive for commitment to excellence in corporate governance and not just adhering to minimum standards prescribed by law. This is especially true in today's environment and requires a goal of continuous improvement. Similar to evaluating the organization's chief executive officer, executive director and management for the organization's performance, the board must evaluate itself to constantly improve. A yearly board evaluation will allow an organization to: 

  • Check progress against mission and goals Give directors a meaningful measure of accountability 
  • Allow for a check of strengths and weaknesses 
  • Emphasize the accomplishments of the board 
  • Provide a yardstick with which the goals of the coming year can be measured; 
  • Encourage teamwork approach to decision making; and 
  • Give a feeling of accomplishment 
  • Board Composition/Succession Planning. Succession is critical to the life of any organization. As such, one of a board's most important responsibilities is succession of management and the board. A good succession plan helps to prevent staleness on the board. Preventing staleness or "institutionalization" of thought on the board is in the best interests of the organization and its mission. However, adding directors with fresh or non-institutional thoughts comes with a price, whether accomplished through traditional approaches such as term limits or age restrictions or by involving the board in making itself an "expertise" board. Getting your board to buy into a succession plan helps create a multi-generational board that is future oriented and prepared for emergency absences. 

  • Update your Organization's Conflict of Interest Policy and Disclosure Process. All nonprofit organizations need to have a well defined conflict of interest policy and disclosure process. A failure in an organization's conflict of interest policy will have an immediate impact on public confidence of any organization in addition to exposing the board to potential liability. 

  • Review Executive Compensation. Review and, where appropriate, revise executive incentive compensation arrangements to ensure that they do not encourage executives and others in management to take unnecessary and excessive risks that threaten the value and mission of their organizations. 

What's Next?

Regardless of the cause, the melt down of the for-profit world will directly impact how directors of nonprofit organizations must think, evaluate and make decisions. Whether viewed as an overdue wake-up call or an unfair impugning of the nonprofit director's integrity as a result of the actions of the for-profits, it is important that all directors of nonprofit organizations understand the increased scrutiny on boards and the need for the boards to understand the risks of the organization. This includes understanding and recognizing the state of the environment the organization is operating. The economic crisis is going to have an effect on many organizations that are not interested in making a profit for private inurement. Nonprofits rely on corporate and private donations and interest income from their endowments for programs, operational support and long term sustainability, To maintain and to continue to receive this financial support in these challenging times, organizations need to strive to maintain the public trust and confidence in their operations, financial risk management and direction. 

Directors need to become risk smarter. They need to broaden their view of risk and not limit discussions or analysis only to specific areas of risk This will require directors to evaluate the role of the boards overseeing that there is adequate risk assessment and make changes where appropriate. As the watchdogs for the organization, directors must realize not only that they remain the first and best line of defense against mismanagement and fraud but also that they can be the best line of offense for good management and best practices.


 
Posted by K. Kinross in  Board Structure & Organization  Fiduciary Duties  Legal Developments  Non Profit Governance  Regulatory Issues/Reform   |   Permalink

 

Jan 20, 2009

New Year ... New Risks ... New Challenges -- Besides Uncertainty What Does It Mean for Corporate Governance?
 

As the new year begins the United States and the world remain saddled with an economic crisis that has not been witnessed in decades. 

A new administration in Washington takes over today, and there still exists uncertainty in how this administration, or Congress, will act to address this crisis in what commentators, and politicians, scream was a failure at the board level to understand and assess the risks of the organization and the boards failure to independently assess management of the organizations. Rumors abound speak of the Democratic Senate considering a bill to federalize fiduciary duties and impose a standard to act with the care that a prudent person acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use -similar to the ERISA standard- as opposed to the state law ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under similar circumstances. Yet to date we wait to see what the formal response will be.

As a result of the economic crisis, boards of directors will need to respond to unknown challenges and pressures. Boards need to review their past actions in monitoring performance, compliance and risk management—and understand the role they must play going forward. The risk oversight role of the board has never been more critical and challenging than it is today.

In reviewing their role in overseeing risk to the organization, boards need to understand the changes that are likely coming, either through the courts applying new standards or interpreting existing ones, that will directly impact how these boards perform their functions and fulfill their fiduciary duties and likely increase board responsibility for risk management. While the current standard for director liability, established in Delaware by the Caremark case, requires that directors act as reasonably prudent person in a like or similar situation and provides the protection of the business judgment rule, if rumors are true there is real possibility that, as a result of the current economic crisis, boards will need to change how they act. Boards’ decisions will be in the crosshairs and will provide courts with repeated occasions to second-guess board decisions. 

The only certainty going forward is uncertainty. Uncertainty as to the when the recession will end, when the liquidity markets will thaw, when things will return to “normal”—whatever that is. 

One thing that we can be certain of is that there will be some kind of regulatory response to the economic crisis: just as the federal government reacted to the market crash of 1929 with the 33’ and 34’ Acts, just as the federal government reacted to expansion of United States businesses into foreign countries with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and just as the federal government reacted to the Enron and WorldCom scandals with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Yes- there will be a regulatory response. But again there is uncertainty as to what the end product will look like. Boards need to be proactive in addressing new risks and new challenges this year will bring. By doing so Boards will be well prepared to handle and adjust to whatever regulatory response comes out of Washington.


 
Posted by K. Kinross in  Board Structure & Organization  Fiduciary Duties  Legal Developments  Non Profit Governance  Regulatory Issues/Reform   |   Permalink

 

Aug 15, 2008

Remember to Speak as One
 

An important part of both the duty of care and the duty of loyalty is that organizations and their governing boards should speak with one voice or not at all. Directors should presume that this applies to all matters coming before the board for its consideration. An individual director has no authority under applicable law. Instead, authority is vested in directors collectively as they determine by a majority vote at a meeting at which a quorum is present. This does not require unanimity in decisions, but instead requires a recognition that a board speaks only as a board as determined by a majority of its members at meeting in which a quorum is present. Occasionally on matters where it is important to have a single message, a board will speak only through its chairperson or the chairperson’s designee.

A director who dissents has the right to have his or her dissent reflected, with attribution, in the minutes of the meeting and may continue soliciting support for his or her position until the minutes are approved. Thereafter, the director may, subject to any rules of the board, request the board’s reconsideration of the matter. However, the confidentiality obligation that is part of each director’s duty of care requires that the matter remain within the board room, and the director’s ultimate right in any disagreement is to resign.


 
Posted by J. Beavers in  Fiduciary Duties  Non Profit Governance   |   Permalink

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